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1 Introduction
In recent years the focus of the aid effectiveness debate has moved away from the
traditional saving and foreign exchange gap theories to the institutional and policy gaps
(Burnside and Dollar 2000). This new literature emphasises the importance of good
policies as a precondition not only for the working of aid but also for aid allocation. Put
differently it is argued that aid is only effective, in promoting growth, in countries with
good policy environments and, therefore, donors should target these countries with their
aid. This argument was echoed loudly in the much-discussed Assessing Aid (World
Bank 1998). However, Lensink and White (1999) and Hansen and Tarp (2000 and
2001) among others have questioned the above conclusions on several grounds, with
Hansen and Tarp (2001) finding that the impact of aid on growth is not conditional on
good policies. This debate in the literature remains unresolved.
One of the shortcomings of the aid–growth literature – the main focus of most aid
effectiveness studies – is that it overlooks the fact that aid is given primarily to the
government and therefore any macroeconomic impact will depend on public sector
fiscal behaviour (McGillivray 1994; Franco-Rodriguez et al. 1998; McGillivray and
Morrissey 2001; Mavrotas 2002). One area of the wider aid effectiveness debate has
attempted to look at how foreign aid inflows affect recipient government fiscal
behaviour. Two main approaches have been adopted in this literature. The first approach
is uniquely concerned with fungibility, which arises if recipients have the ability to use
aid for purposes other than those for which donors provided it. This issue has been
discussed extensively in Assessing Aid where it is argued ‘donors should take it for
granted that their aid is fungible because that is the reality’ (World Bank 1998: 80).
Well-known empirical studies that deal with the issue of fungibility include Pack and
Pack (1990, 1993), Khilji and Zampelli (1994) and Feyzioglu et al. (1998). The second
approach addresses the fiscal impact of aid in a much broader context. It goes beyond
aid’s impact on expenditure types to look at how other sources of revenue (tax and
borrowing) are affected by these inflows. This area of research, known as the fiscal
response literature, has received increasing attention since the seminal contribution of
Heller (1975). Studies such as Mosley et al. (1987), Gang and Khan (1991), Otim
(1996) and more recently Franco-Rodriguez et al. (1998), McGillivray and Ahmed
(1999), Franco-Rodriguez (2000), McGillivray (2000), Mavrotas (2002) and Mavrotas
and Ouattara (2003) have all addressed the issue.
This paper applies a fiscal response model to look at the interactions between aid and
government fiscal behaviour in Côte d’Ivoire during 1975–99. Côte d’Ivoire is an
interesting case study, as annual debt servicing constitutes approximately 40 per cent of
all government expenditure and absorbs more than half of its domestic revenue
(Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances 1997). The fiscal response model used in the
paper differs significantly from those previously applied, in recognition of this fact, by
identifying interaction between debt service expenditure and other fiscal aggregates,
including aid. A further departure from previous research is that the model’s parameters
are estimated in a way that ensures that all estimates are consistent with the theoretical
model. This important point, as it will become clear later, has been overlooked by most
previous studies. A key finding of this paper is that a large part of foreign aid is used for
public debt servicing rather than other areas of government expenditure. Another key2
finding is that aid inflows do not reduce the level of debt in Côte d’Ivoire; this conflicts
with conventional wisdom that aid and debt are substitutes.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the fiscal
response model used in this paper, highlighting its differences to previous such models.
Section 3 discusses data issues and the econometric method used in the estimation
process. Section 4 presents the results and their interpretations. Concluding remarks and
policy recommendations are provided Section 5.
2 A fiscal response model
Fiscal response studies assume that public sector decision-makers are faced with the
task of allocating resources among expenditure types subject to budgetary constraints.
These decision-makers are further assumed to behave as if they were a single individual
with a well-behaved, homothetic preference map and with the utility function:
) , , , , ( B A T G I f U G = (1)
where  IG represents public investment expenditure, G is government consumption
expenditure,  T is tax and other recurrent domestic revenue, A is net foreign aid
disbursements (comprising grants and net aid loans) and B is net borrowing from other
sources. All variables are for period t. Equation (1) is that posited by Franco-Rodriguez
et al. (1998). Various representations of this equation have been used in the literature,
with some studies, for example, disaggregating G into recurrent and socioeconomic
consumption expenditure or A into grants and loans. The interest of the current study is
in debt servicing. In (1) this variable will be imbedded within A and B, but will clearly
require a separate treatment for countries with relatively high levels of debt servicing.
We therefore replace (1) with the utility function:
) , , , , ( B A T D E f U = (2)
where E is both government investment and consumption expenditure, D is public debt
servicing, T is tax and other recurrent domestic revenue, A is foreign aid disbursements
(grants and gross aid loans) and B is gross borrowing from all other sources. IG and G
have been aggregated to form E to make the model empirically tractable given degrees
of freedom issues.1
The standard approach in the fiscal response literature is to write the public sector utility
function as a quadratic loss function, which assumes that decision-makers set annual
targets for each expenditure and revenue variable and consciously strive to achieve
these targets. We see no reason to depart from this approach and therefore write (2) as
follows:
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1 A useful extension of the model is disaggregation of the aid variable following Mavrotas (2002) and
Mavrotas and Ouattara (2003).3
       





where the starred variables represent exogenous targets and αi > 0, ∀ i = 1, …, 5. Utility
function (3) as defined above implies that each year the government sets its targets for
IG, G, T, A, and B and maximises its utility by trying to achieve these targets and any
deviation from these targets results in a loss in utility. It follows that (3) reaches a
maximum at α0. A fuller discussion of the general form of (3) can be found in Binh and
McGillivray (1993), Franco-Rodriguez et al. (1998) and Mavrotas (2002).
Broadly following Franco-Rodriguez et al. (1998), the decision-maker is assumed to
maximise utility function (2) subject to the following budget constraints:
B A T D E + + = + (4)
B A T D 3 2 1 ρ ρ ρ + + ≤ (5)
where ρ1, ρ2, and ρ3, are the proportions of taxes, aid, and borrowing allocated to debt
servicing, respectively. Consequently, given that the model contains two categories of
expenditure (E and D), (1 – ρ1), (1 – ρ2) and (1 – ρ3) the proportions of tax, aid, and
borrowing directed towards public investment and consumption expenditure.
Equation (4) is simply the government’s overall budget constraint which must always
hold. The rationale for the inequality written in (5) is that there are external constraints
that limit the manner in which the public sector in developing countries allocates
revenues. The actions of donors or domestic interests cause the values of the ρs in (5) to
be imposed on those involved in setting targets and allocating revenue, with there being
no guarantee that targets can be met even though revenues may satisfy (4). In other
words, on the assumption that (5) is binding (the possible value of D is upper bound),
these external constraints prevent the attainment of α0 because at least one expenditure
target cannot be met. Our analysis is premised on this assumption. If (5) is not binding
the government is able to reach its expenditure targets, utility is maximised subject to
(4) only and the government can attain α0 if revenues are sufficient.
As is tradition in practically all fiscal response studies we assume ex ante that targeted
domestic borrowing B
*, albeit gross borrowing in the present case, is equal to zero.
Maximising (3) subject to (4) and (5) with B
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Solving the system of structural equations (6)–(10) leads to the following reduced form
equations, where each endogenous variable in (3) is expressed in terms of the
exogenous variables represented by the target variables:
** **
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** **
17 18 19 20 B EDTA δδδδ =+++ (15)
where the δs are combinations of ρs, from equation (5) and αs are from the utility
function written in (3). The coefficients of interest are those relating the total impact of
aid on the endogenous variables. The composition of these coefficients is:5
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3 Data issues and estimation method
The structural and reduced form equation parameters were estimated using time series
data for Côte d’Ivoire for the period of 1975–99. All variables are expressed in billions
of CFA Francs at constant 1995 prices. Data on gross foreign aid disbursements (A)
were obtained from the OECD online database. McGillivray and Morrissey (2000,
2001) note that these data are a donor measure of aid and may not always correspond to
the flows of funds into the recipient country fiscal budget. In the present context data
availability dictated using the OECD aid statistics. Data for annual debt service (D),
government expenditure (E), tax revenues (T) and income (Y) were obtained from the
African Live Data and the African Development Indicators. Debt service data includes
both payments made on domestic and external debt. Data for gross borrowing is
obtained as a residual calculated as the difference between total expenditure (E and D)
and the other sources of revenue (T and A), as is standard practice in the fiscal response
literature.
The estimation procedure consists of three stages. Firstly, like most fiscal response
studies, the target variables are approximated, as data on these variables could not be
obtained directly. These targets are estimated as a long-run relationship where it was
possible to find a co-integrating regression between the target variable and some
explanatory variables. When it is not possible to establish such a co-integrating
relationship, like Franco-Rodriguez (2000), the targets are approximated using
autoregressive techniques. The target for foreign aid disbursement is set equal to aid
commitments, following Franco-Rodriguez et al. (1998) and McGillivray and Ahmed
(1999). The targets, in logarithmic terms, are expressed as follows (with standard errors
in parenthesis):
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* respectively, expressed in logarithm terms. The borrowing target (B
*), as
already mentioned, is set equal to zero.
In the second stage of the estimation, the structural equations (6)–(10) are estimated
using the non-linear three-stage least squares technique. Given that the system is
simultaneous and contains cross-equation restrictions with respect to the ρs and βs, this
technique is appropriate (McGillivray 2000). Finally, the system of structural equations,
obtained from the previous stage, is solved to get the reduced form parameters.
Before reporting the estimates it is important to stress two important points that have
been largely overlooked in the fiscal response literature. Not addressing these points can
lead to seriously misleading conclusions, as is shown later in this paper. The first relates
to ρ1, ρ2 and ρ3, which as pointed out earlier, are proportions of tax, aid and borrowing
allocated to debt repayments, respectively. Given that these parameters are proportions
their estimates must lie within the range of zero and one, as McGillivray and Morrissey
(2000) observe. A government cannot allocate a negative share of taxes, aid or
borrowing to an expenditure area. Nor can it allocate more than 100 per cent of these
variables to an expenditure area. Most previous fiscal response models have failed to
recognise this important point, with many reporting ρs which are either negative or
greater than one (McGillivray and Morrissey 2001).
The second point relates to the βs. All fiscal response studies, with the exception of
McGillivray and Ahmed (1999) and McGillivray (2000), report negative values of these
parameters. But the theoretical model does not permit this; a point previously
overlooked in the literature. The αs must be greater than zero to ensure diminishing
utility if the government deviates from the targets. This, combined with the fact that the
ρs lie between zero and one, dictates that θ1, θ2 and θ3 are each positive. In this case,
looking at the expressions of each of the βs, it is also clear that their estimates must be
positive if the estimated model is to be consistent with the theoretical model.
The response to these two estimation issues is straightforward. One can simply impose
the theoretical restrictions during estimation, as most econometric software packages
permit. The ρs were restricted to lie between the range of zero and one and the βs were
restricted to be equal to or greater than zero. Failing to impose these restrictions can
lead to seriously misleading conclusions, as is shown below.2
                                                
2 Further estimation details can be obtained from the authors. Note that we do not attempt to take
account of the time series properties of the data in this stage of the estimation, as there is currently no
known way of doing so in the context of non-linear systems estimation.7
4 Results and interpretation
Results obtained from estimating the structural equations, with restrictions imposed, are
shown in Table 1. As can be seen from this table, ρ1, ρ2 and ρ3 are all within their
theoretical range. Also, the estimates of the βs parameters all positive as expected. As
such the econometric estimates satisfy the theoretical model and one can confidently
interpret the results. The estimates of the constraint equation parameters, ρ1, ρ2 and ρ3,
are respectively 0.285, 0.622 and 0.00. These results indicate that around 29 per cent of
tax revenue and more than 60 per cent of aid disbursements are used for debt
repayments in the case of Côte d’Ivoire, and that none of the borrowing is used for debt
servicing. What is more, contrary to the studies of Griffin (1970), Boone (1996), and
more recently the World Bank (1998) which argue that much foreign aid is used to
finance government consumption, the estimate of ρ2 also indicates that debt servicing
and not consumption is the main destination of aid funds. This finding confirms earlier
results by Pack and Pack (1993) who found that around 88 cents per dollar of aid are
used for debt servicing in the Dominican Republic.
Table 1 Estimates of structural parameters with restrictions




























Notes: ***, **, *: significantly different from zero at 99, 95 and 90 per cent
levels, respectively.
Table 2 Estimates of structural parameters without restrictions




























Note:  ***: significantly different from zero at 99 per cent level.8
Estimates of the structural equations without restrictions imposed are shown in Table 2.
Two of the three ρs and three of the βs are negative, and very different conclusions
would emerge from these results regarding the impact of aid and the interaction of the
fiscal variables in general. The approach of imposing restrictions on the non-linear
three-stage least squares estimation would therefore seem justified.
The estimates of the βis do not have a straightforward interpretation, but they allow us to
determine the estimates of the structural equations when combined with the ρis. Table 3
summarises the direct incremental impact of endogenous changes in the revenue
variables. Parameters that are insignificantly different from zero are set to zero in
calculating the different impacts, following McGillivray (2002). Foreign aid
disbursements have a positive impact on debt servicing. Each CFA Franc increase in aid
results in an increase in debt repayments of almost half that amount. This confirms the
above finding that a large share of aid inflows are used for debt service. Aid appears to
have a small negative direct incremental impact on government expenditure. With
regard to tax and borrowing, results in Table 3 indicate that aid inflows discourage
taxation efforts, and that the government substitutes borrowing for aid on a one-to-one
basis.
Table 3 Direct incremental impacts of revenue variables
Impact Mechanism Estimate
   Ao nD 21 2 11 2 2 [( 1 ) ] ρρ ρ βρ ρ β −− − 0.43
   Ao nE 21 2 1 1 2 2 [(1 ) (1 )(1 ) (1 ) ] ρρ ρ β ρ ρ β −− − − − − -0.11
   Ao nT 21 2 2 [(1 ) ] ρβ ρ β −− + -0.68
   Ao nB 25 2 6 [(1 ) ] ρβ ρ β −− + -1.02
   B on D 31 3 11 3 2 [( 1 ) ] ρρ ρ βρ ρ β −− − -0.39
   B on E 31 3 1 1 3 2 [(1 ) (1 )(1 ) (1 ) ] ρρ ρ β ρ ρ β −− − − − − 0.02
   B on T 33 3 4 [(1 ) ] ρβ ρ β −− + -1.37
   B on A 13 1 4 [(1 ) ] ρβ ρ β −− + -0.00
   To nA 13 1 4 [(1 ) ] ρβ ρ β −− + -0.03
   To nB 15 1 6 [(1 ) ] ρβ ρ β −− + -1.28
The fiscal response model can also be used to assess the impacts of domestic and other
revenues, gross borrowing in this case, on public sector fiscal aggregates. From Table 3
it follows that the direct impacts of an increase in borrowing are a reduction in debt
servicing and an increase in government expenditure. This is another indication that the
Ivorian government borrows to finance government expenditure and not to service its
debt. Turning to taxation the evidence shows that an increase in borrowing is
compensated by a decrease in taxation. Aid disbursements barely respond to changes in
borrowing. With regard to the direct impact of taxes the results show that increases in
taxes are offset by decreases in borrowing. What is more, borrowing decreases by more
than the increase in taxation, thus implying increasing taxation effort would help cut9
borrowing considerably. Borrowing and taxation affect each other by almost the same
magnitude, thus implying the Ivorian authorities substitute one for the other.
As mentioned earlier, the results related to the structural equations only show the direct,
and therefore partial, impacts of the revenue variables on each endogenous variable.
Total impacts are captured by the estimates of the reduced form equations. Table 4
shows reduced form equation parameters relating to the total impact of aid, our prime
interest.3 These parameters suggest that the total impact of a 1000 CFA Franc increase
in aid is a 340 Franc increase on debt servicing, thus confirming the above finding that
part of the aid to Côte d’Ivoire is used to reduce the debt burden. Government
expenditure does not appear to increase following increases in aid inflows. Turning to
taxation and other recurrent revenue, the results indicate that, for every 1000 Franc
increase in aid revenue would fall by 920 Franc. Given that the reduction in revenue is
greater than the reduction expenditure it can be deduced that the total impact of aid on
public saving is negative. Judging from the estimate of the total impact of aid on
borrowing it is clear that contrary to the general belief, aid inflows do not lead to a
reduction in borrowing. Similar findings are reported by Franco-Rodriguez et al. (1998)
in the case of Pakistan, and Feeny and McGillivray (2002) for a cross-section of
developing countries. One of the reasons why, in the case of Côte d’Ivoire, borrowing
might not decrease following increases in aid is that, while borrowing is used to support
government expenditure (investment and consumption), foreign aid is used to finance
the huge debt servicing burden and not reductions in gross debt. With regard to aid, the
evidence shows that around 96 per cent of aid commitments to Côte d’Ivoire are
disbursed; Ivorian authorities would appear to have a high degree of bargaining power
in convincing donors to release committed aid funds.
















5 Conclusion and policy implications
This paper analysed the effects of aid inflows on the public sector fiscal behaviour in
Côte d’Ivoire for the period of 1975–99. It contributes to the existing fiscal response
literature on two grounds. First, it uses a model that takes into account an important
element of most developing countries fiscal activities, that is, the debt issue, which has
been overlooked by most fiscal response studies. Second, on the estimation front, the
paper derives econometric estimates that are consistent with the theoretical settings of
                                                
3 All other reduced form parameters are available on request from the authors.10
the model, and thus provides more reliable estimates with regard to the different impacts
of foreign aid.
One of the key findings of this paper is that a large proportion of aid to Côte d’Ivoire is
used for debt servicing. This may be one of the reasons why many aid effectiveness
studies have failed to establish a strong relation between aid and growth. Turning to
taxation, aid seems to induce decrease in taxation effort and worse a decrease in public
savings. Nonetheless, this decrease in public savings may be offset by an increase in
private savings, as the reduction in taxes could benefit the private sector. Another
finding of this paper is the fact that aid does not appear to induce reduction in
borrowing. Most borrowing, it was found, is used to finance government expenditure on
investment and consumption.
The policy recommendation of this paper, based on the above evidence, is given that the
debt burden pulls resources (aid in particular) away from domestic expenditure
(including investment) donors should help Côte d’Ivoire and other HIPCs in alleviating
the burden in order to make aid work more effectively. One solution to the problem
would be to allocate aid (in the form of more grants) not on the grounds of a good
policy environment, as argued by Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Assessing Aid, but
relative to the size of debt burden. This could help developing countries grow out of
their debt. Another solution could be the expansion of developing countries’ export
revenues through the adoption of fair trade policies by industrial countries. Finally, debt
forgiveness could also be a useful tool in helping developing countries by removing the
constraints imposed by debt servicing on their domestic economy.
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